fixes:
  - id: 1
    explanation: 'Allowing transfers to the zero address actually weakens the Soulbound Token by permitting burning. This does not address the predictable token ID vulnerability at all.'
  - id: 2
    explanation: 'Using a hash of contextual data like the timestamp, recipient address and token URI to generate the token ID makes it non-predictable and prevents an attacker from guessing or front-running token IDs.'
  - id: 3
    explanation: 'Changing the visibility of safeMint to private makes it uncallable from outside the contract, effectively breaking the minting functionality entirely. The onlyOwner modifier already restricts access sufficiently.'
  - id: 4
    explanation: 'Removing the counter increment means every subsequent call to safeMint will attempt to mint a token with the same ID, causing all minting after the first to fail.'
hints:
  - 'How are the token IDs for newly minted NFTs determined?'
  - 'What would happen if an attacker could predict the next token ID?'
  - 'Look into the risks of using sequential counters for security-sensitive identifiers.'
